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Sammendrag 
Har inflasjonsstyring og arbeidsinnvandring medført strukturelle endringer i det norske 
systemet for lønnsdannelse? 
 
Den norske modellen for lønnsdannelse er en kollektiv samfunnskontrakt mellom staten og partene i 
arbeidslivet. Partene i arbeidslivet har ansvar for å forhandle en lønn som anses som bærekraftig mens 
myndighetene skal sørge for lav og stabil prisvekst. Gjennom koordinerte lønnsoppgjør mellom 
partene i arbeidslivet forhandler frontfaget først mens lønnsveksten i øvrige næringer følger rammen 
fra fronfagsoppgjøret. På denne måten bestemmer pris- og produktivitetsveksten i konkurranseutsatt 
industri lønnsveksten for alle lønnstakere.  Den norske modellen ses på som en av forklaringene til at 
Norge både har kombinert høy sysselsetting med lav inflasjon, og modellen har overlevd både den 
internasjonale stagflasjonen på 1970-tallet og hus- og bankkrisen vi hadde på 1980-tallet.  
 
Vi har undersøkt om det norske systemet for lønnsdannelse har blitt vesentlig påvirket av to store 
endringer, som hver for seg har hatt potensiale til endre lønnsfastsettelsen; først ved overgang til 
inflasjonsmål i 2001 og senere ved at tilgangen på arbeidskraft har økt vesentlig i etterkant av EU-
utvidelsen østover i 2004.  
 
Ved å benytte data for perioden 1980 til 2011 finner vi at den store tilgangen på arbeidskraft så langt 
har dempet lønnsveksten. Systemet for lønnsdannelse i Norge er for øvrig  inntakt. Spesielt finner vi at 
lønnsveksten er forankret i lønnsevnen i frontfaget, også etter overgangen til inflasjonsstyring i 2001. 
Dermed har ikke omleggingen av systemet endret lønnsfastsettelsen slik Norges Bank så for seg de 
første årene på 2000-tallet. Vi forklarer dette med at partene i lønnsoppgjørene har ansett 
inflasjonsutsiktene som svært viktig for utviklingen i lønnsveksten lenge før overgangen til 
inflasjonsmål. Dermed har pengepolitikken i stor grad blitt som et «nytt lag» med nominell 
stabilisering, heller enn å ha repesentert noe kvalitativt nytt i den norske lønnsdannelsen. 
 
1 Introduction
In Norway, the post-war system for wage formation was originally designed to balance the
need for relative inﬂation control with the attainment of full employment and a balanced
current account, cf. Aukrust (1977). The system has survived both the international stagﬂa-
tion of the 1970s and the Norwegian housing and banking crisis in 1989-90. It was based on
an agreement between the government and the wage setters. The government committed to
a ﬁxed exchange rate policy, while the wage setters committed to collective wage bargaining.
The system of wage ﬁxing in Norway unfolds along both the horizontal and vertical dimen-
sion, implying that wage setting is based both on bargaining between evenly matched labour
unions and ﬁrms’ organizations, and bargaining at a high level. Later, similar systems were
adopted in, for example, Sweden, see Edgren et al. (1969) and the Netherlands. A presen-
tation of the Norwegian model from an econometric perspective is found in B˚ardsen et al.
(2005, Ch. 3).
The system for wage formation created a link between the wage norm for the overall
economy, which was determined by the sector exposed to international competition, and
proﬁtability and productivity growth in the same sector. For several decades the system has
linked wage increases in the other sectors of the economy (known as wage-followers) to wage
formation in the exposed sector (the wage-leader). Down the years, it has been accepted,
even supported, by governments of diﬀerent party colours. Probably a recognition of the idea
that this version of pattern bargaining represents an operational way of creating a certain
degree of coordination in wage setting.
One threat to this system is the secular decline in the traditional manufacturing indus-
tries, which in Norway has been accelerated by the extraction of oil and gas and the use of
the resulting ’oil-money’. Nevertheless, several commentators have noted the stability of the
Norwegian norm-based system. For example by Visser (2013, p. 59-60), and also by OECD
economists:
... the so called traditional (‘non-oil’) sector has been diminishing in importance.
Despite this, it is important in wage setting. Rather than wages being determined
by the relative bargaining strength of diﬀerent sectors, the general wage level is
set by the social partners ﬁrst considering the wage increases that the traditional
sector can “aﬀord”. OECD (2012, p. 15)
Nevertheless, the functioning of the wage formation system has been challenged by two
important events in the last decade: the transition towards inﬂation targeting formally
introduced in 2001 and the EU enlargement in 2004, which led to a large increase in the
labour supply.
The change in monetary policy, from exchange rate stabilization to inﬂation targeting,
can potentially change wage formation and the degree of coordination among wage setters,
see Cuikerman and Lippi (1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000) and Holden (2005). In Norway,
the introduction of inﬂation targeting in 2001 could potentially have a direct impact on
wage formation, to the extent that it came into conﬂict with the ‘existing order’ based on
manufacturing sector wage leadership. This potential for conﬂict was brought into focus by
the central bank’s Inﬂation Report from 2002. That report stated that the new monetary
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policy required a reversal of the causality ﬂow in wage formation.1 The bank’s worry was
that the wage leader model could pull inﬂation in one direction (up for example, because
productivity growth is higher there than in the service sectors), at the same time as monetary
policy analysis suggested a reduction of aggregate demand relative to the bank’s estimate
of the Norwegian economy’s potential output. This issue can also be related to theoretical
research, showing that the pattern of wage bargaining under inﬂation targeting may be of
marginal importance, e.g. Calmfors and Seim (2013). Hence, the hypothesis emerged that
new monetary policy would force a change of roles in the pattern wage bargaining, where
the wage-followers may become wage-leaders and vice versa.
With regards to immigration, research based on microeconomic data has found evidence
that immigration has reduced wage earnings in certain groups in the labour market, see
Bratsberg and Raaum (2012). The hypothesis is that, unless the immigrants emulate in-
cumbent workers as regards trade union membership, increased immigration may reduce
trade unions’ bargaining power. The result might be that wage growth in sectors with high
immigration rates deviates from the general wage growth.
We investigate empirically the degree of invariance in wage formation with respect to these
structural changes. First, we investigate whether the value of labour productivity remains the
main determinant of the wage trend in the exposed sector. Second, we test whether the wage
norm created by the exposed sector still has a deﬁning role in Norwegian wage formation.
Third, we investigate whether inﬂation expectations have become more important after the
introduction of inﬂation targeting. Finally, we include a labour immigration variable in our
information set and identify its role in our structural model of wage formation.
We use quarterly data from 1980 to 2011. This means that about 1/3 of the sample
comes from the era with a monetary policy regime that targeted inﬂation, and that about
1/4 of the sample comes from the recent period of increasing and high labour immigration.
Hence, if either the monetary policy regime shift or the new immigration ﬂow has aﬀected
wage formation or the social order with any force, the evidence should be in this data set.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we outline the theoretical framework of
coordination in Norway and deﬁne the twin concepts of wage-leader and wage-follower sectors
in wage formation. Based on the theoretical and statistical properties of the time series in
Section 3, we formulate an empirical model, test the wage-leader/-follower properties, and
carry out analysis of the model in Section 4. In Section 5, we conclude that the econometric
results suggest that the Norwegian wage model has preserved its main properties in spite of
the recent challenges to the system.
1The following quotation from Inﬂation Report number 3/2002, page 28 summarizes the hypothesis: With
an inﬂation target for monetary policy and a ﬂoating exchange rate, it is the inﬂation target, not wage growth
abroad, that determines the level of growth which is consistent with stable proﬁtability in the business sector
over time. Inﬂation in Norway will over time be determined by the inﬂation target that the Government has
set for monetary policy and not inﬂation abroad. Exchange rate developments are determined by inﬂation
diﬀerentials between Norway and other countries.
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2 Wage formation
The twin concepts of wage-leader and wage-followers are important in the Norwegian sys-
tem of wage formation. Wage-leader refers to the sector (or sectors) where the bargaining
outcome deﬁnes the wage norm that forms the basis for bargaining in the other sectors of
the economy (wage-followers). Throughout the whole post-war period, the settlements in
the manufacturing sector have in practice deﬁned the wage norm.2
We also deﬁne the manufacturing industry as the wage-leading sector but we test whether
that role has been preserved so far in the new millennium. For the wage-followers, we have
chosen to distinguish between the private service sector (including construction, mainly
because of the importance of engineering consultancy in this sector) and the public sector.
But also because negotiations in the public sector start after the wage settlements in private
sector. Hence, in the following, we number the sectors 1 (wage-leader), 2 (wage-follower,
private) and 3 (wage-follower, public).
2.1 The Wage-leader
The formulation of a theory of a sustainable wage norm requires an assessment of not only
self-interest among workers and ﬁrms, but also of compromise. As pointed out by Usher
(2012), ‘compromise is then not just another way of talking about self-interest, and social,
political and institutional forces are not merely cover-ups for imprecisely modelled individuals
rational actions, they are among the fundamental determinants of decisions. In this view,
even a full analysis of rational behaviour leads to an indeterminacy of wages, and other
considerations had to be introduced to resolve it.
The recognition among economists that there is an indeterminacy in the economic theory
of wages goes back to the 1950s, see Forder (2014, Ch. 1.4) who cites Samuelson (1951,
p. 312) and Hicks (1955, p. 390) and other leading theorists. The economic theory of
supply and demand could set some limits to what wages can be set, but within those limits
closer determination requires that other relationships are introduced. The indeterminacy
of wages from theory also characterizes the now standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
(DMP) search and matching model. In the DMP model, the wage is usually determined
in a Nash bargaining game. But is the wage logically equal to the Nash solution given the
assumptions of the DMP model? As Hall (2005) pointed out, any wage in the bargaining set
is in principle consistent with private eﬃciency on the part of both the ﬁrm and the worker.
In that sense, the equilibrium wage rate is only set-identiﬁed. He then went on to analyze
a solution where the real wage is ﬁxed, which however is only one possibility of what in the
DMP-literature is referred to as wage ‘stickiness’. 3
2Because of its importance, the system of wage-formation is a recurrent theme in public (and at times
academic) debate. For example, the “traditional” deﬁnition of wage-leader has been challenged several times
over the last decades. Those wanting to “change the content” of the wage-leading sector has emphasized
both reduced legitimacy of the norm, as the importance of the sector for the total wage bill has become
smaller, and reduced relevance (since Norwegian manufacturing may have become integrated in the super
proﬁtable oil and gas extraction). Among the arguments that are used in favour of no-change is that a
manufacturing wage-norm aids coordination.
3Following Hall (2005), several papers have incorporated rigid wage setting in search models. For instance,
Gertler and Trigari (2009) present a DMP model where the frequency of wage bargaining is constrained by
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At the same time as we ﬁnd it challenging to determine wages theoretically, we also
observe that actual wage bargains are struck year after year, and that they are rationalized
by considerations of proﬁts, actual and required (to attract investments), cost of living
and relative wages (fairness). These observed regularities give reason to believe that wage
formation can be subject to econometric treatment. This is also what have motivated much
of the econometric literature recently surveyed by Forder (2014). A development that goes
back to the ﬁrst half of the 1960s in Norway (although it was documented in English only
later, by Aukrust (1977)) was that the wage norm became deﬁned as a long-run trend, and
also that short-run deviations had to be tolerated as ‘part of the system’. But how should
the trend be deﬁned? Should it be a combination of the many things that might legitimate
a secular trend trend? Or should the number of norm determined factors be limited? In
Norway, a view that won support on both sides for the arbitration system, was that it was
important to ‘keep it simple’ and relate the wage norm to the value of labour productivity
in the exposed sector of the economy.
This idea of a wage norm can be treated econometrically using cointegration methods and
equilibrium correction modelling. One of the main implications that we follow up is that,
measured on a logarithmic scale, the wage level in the exposed sector, should be cointegrated
with the log of the level of product prices and average labour productivity. Long-run price
homogeneity together with a unit long-run elasticity on productivity lead to the implica-
tion of a stationary wage-share which may serve as an operationalization of an equilibrium
wage-share. In the wider interpretation, the equilibrium income distribution needs not be
completely constant but can depend on intermittent shifts, or trends, in bargaining power
(possibly proxied by the unemployment rate) and the support to the idea about necessary
compromise and coordination.
We base our econometric model on the assumption that both product price (q1) and
average labour productivity (z1) are random-walk processes with drift. It follows that the
time series for w1t (the logarithm of the hourly wage in the wage-leader sector) contains both
a deterministic and a stochastic (random walk) trend.4
Formally, the value of average labour productivity can be split into two components: q1t
(the log of the price in Norwegian currency) and z1t (the log of average productivity in ﬁxed
prices), and these exogenous processes can be expressed as two random-walks with drift:
q1t = q10 + q1t−1 + vq1t(1)
z1t = z10 + z1t−1 + va1t(2)
(1) and (2) imply that q1 and z1 are integrated of order 1, denoted I(1). Positive deterministic
trends in prices and productivity require q10 > 0 and z10 > 0.
Note that we could write equation (1) in terms of a price that is denoted in foreign
currency, qf1t, and the exchange rate xrt (log of kroner per currency unit) and specify time
Calvo (1983)) style lottery, leading to sticky wages. Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) combine a reduced form
of search model with real wage rigidity with a New Keynesian model to study how this impacts monetary
policy. Krogh (n.d.) generalizes the Hall-approach to a small open economy model where there is a non-trivial
distinction between the consumer real wage and the producer real wage.
4In this section, we abstract from payroll tax rates in all three sectors. A representative payroll tax is
included in the empirical model.
7
series models for qf1t and xrt. To be consistent with q10 > 0 in equation (1), one or both
of these time series models must contain a positive drift parameter. We assume that the
price level variable qf1t has a positive drift, and for simplicity, we also assume that it is a
constant parameter. The speciﬁcation of the process for the nominal exchange rate is more
complicated. For the period with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, it can possibly be speciﬁed
without drift, but with intermittent structural breaks in order to represent devaluations.
After the switch to the present ﬂoating exchange rate regime, a random walk, possibly with
drift, is probably reasonable for the nominal exchange rate.
Hence, also across exchange rate regimes, equation (1) with q10 > 0 is a reasonable ﬁrst
approximation of the evolution of the price level in the wage-leading sector. As noted, there
may be structural breaks in the drift parameter, and the foreign exchange rate regime-shift
may also mean vq1t is not white-noise. The main point, however, is that the unit root
property is robust across regimes and, in particular, that there are no explosive roots that
logically must be included in the model of wage-price formation during the period with a
ﬂoating exchange rate.
As noted, we assume that q1t and z1t jointly determine the deterministic trend in w1t. In
the simplest case, w1t is cointegrated with the sum q1t + z1t, meaning that the logarithm of
the wage share is I(0) with a constant mean s1. This relationship can be written as:
w1t − q1t − z1t = s1 + e1t(3)
e1t ∼ I(0),(4)
The sum of the productivity trend and the foreign price trend plays an important role in
the framework, since it traces out a central tendency or a long-run sustainable scope for
wage growth. This wage norm seems to correspond well to the concept of a wage corridor
(Aukrust (1977)) for wage determination in the industries that are most exposed to foreign
competition.
Cointegration implies equilibrium correction. Therefore, with reference to equations (1)
and (2), e1t−1 should have signiﬁcant predictive power for wage growth, Δw1t (≡ w1t−w1t−1):
(5)
a) (w1 − q1 − z1)t−1 → Δw1t
b) (w2 − w1)t−1  Δw1t
c) (w3 − w1)t−1  Δw1t
The economic interpretation is that collective wage bargaining, through its focus on the
distribution of value added between labour and capital, implies that an equilibrium wage
share (the parameter s1) is maintained over time, cf. Forslund et al. (2008). (5b) and (5c)
capture the idea that if the manufacturing sector is wage leading, it is implied that Δw1t
cannot be inﬂuenced by the lagged relative wage to the two other sectors.
As mentioned above, the equilibrium wage share is likely to depend on several underlying
factors, e.g. related to production technology, product market conditions and bargaining
power. It is only when these factors are constant that s1 is likely to be a stable parameter.
More generally, we can therefore add a time subscript to s1 in equation (3) and write s1t
as a function of the variables that we include as its determinants in the econometric model,
namely the log of the unemployment rate, ut, and the immigration rate, IMt:
s1t = s10 + β11ut + β12IMt.
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Hence, the extended long-run wage equation for sector 1 that we use in the following becomes
(6) w1t − q1t − z1t = s10 + β11ut + β12IMt + e1t
If we abstract from IM , (7) is a standard linearised wage bargaining model, with full weight
on producer prices and no weight on consumer prices, see e.g. Nickell and Andrews (1983)
and Hoel and Nymoen (1988). The signs of the parameters, β11 and β12, are expected to
be negative (or zero). A higher unemployment rate can reduce the bargaining power of the
unions. A marked change in the immigration rate may also aﬀect union bargaining power
and coordination negatively, unless a large proportion of the immigrants choose to become
union members.
2.2 Wage-followers
If the manufacturing wage level represents the wage norm in the pattern of wage bargaining,
and if w1t ∼ I(1), w2t must also be I(1) and cointegrated with w1t:
w2t − w1t = s2 + e2t ,(7)
e2t ∼ I(0),(8)
where s2 is the equilibrium relative wage. Note that equation (7) and (8) can be maintained
by adjustments to wages in both sector 1 and sector 2. In order to deﬁne sector 2 as a
wage-follower with sector 1 as a wage-leader we require:
(9)
a) Δw1t
−→

Δw2t
b) (w2t−1 − w1t−1) −→ Δw2t
Requirement (9a) implies that the contemporaneous relationship between the wage growth
rates in the two sectors is recursive. We can implement and test (9a) as a restriction on
a simultaneous equations model of wage setting. (9b) requires that the stationarity of the
relative wage is due to equilibrium correction in sector 2.
In the Norwegian system of wage ﬁxing, bargaining in the public sector starts after
negotiations in the private sector, and it is therefore natural to assume that w3t equilibrium
corrects with respect to w2t, i.e.:
w3t − w2t = s3 + e3t(10)
e3t ∼ I(0).(11)
The required recursive structure is the same as above, but between sector 2 and sector 3:
(12)
a) Δw2t
−→

Δw3t
b) (w3t−1 − w2t−1) −→ Δw3t
Clearly, for the government sector to be follower of sector 2, Δw2 in (9) should not respond
to (w3 − w2)t−1. In both sectors, we include the possibility of potential wage shifting in the
empirical model. Hence, s2 in equation (7) and s3 in equation (10) can include eﬀects from
the unemployment rate and from the immigration ﬂow in the same way as in equation (6).
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2.3 Wage-price inﬂation
The wage-price spiral is well known from the literature, cf. Blanchard (1987), Meade (1982)
and Layard et al. (1991). In the wake of the ﬁnancial and jobs crisis, the dynamics of wage
and price setting have come to be regarded as central to rebalancing the euro area after the
crisis, cf. ECB (2012) and OECD (2014).
Wage increases to compensate for expected increases in the cost of living are regularly
demanded in the collective wage bargaining context, also in the wage-leading manufacturing
sector. In Norway, a government-supported body, the Technical Calculation Committee for
Wage Settlements (TCC), has the anchoring of CPI inﬂation forecasts as one of its tasks.
The committee consists of representatives of both employer and employee organisations, and
the consolidation of expectations takes place before the annual rounds of wage ﬁxing starts.
Since CPI inﬂation, in turn, depends on growth in wage costs (in addition to the price
of imported consumer goods), it is clear that a realistic system of equations for Δw1t, Δw2t
and Δw3t will not be completely recursive: in the short run, wage adjustments in the man-
ufacturing sector also depend on CPI inﬂation expectations.
Nevertheless, as long as the wage norm that deﬁnes e1t does not include the level of CPI,
the inclusion of the rate of inﬂation in the system of wage formation represents a realistic
modiﬁcation of the otherwise recursive structure.
2.4 Potential reversal of bargaining pattern
As noted in the introduction, it is possible that inﬂation targeting caused an inversion of the
causal ordering in wage formation. Speciﬁcally, that the relative wage w1 − w2 becomes a
predictor of Δw1, rather than of Δw2. According to this hypothesis, neither (5b) nor (9b)
will hold empirically on the latter sample period when monetary policy has changed. The
hypotheses of reversed causality can be tested within the cointegrated VAR .The VAR is
estimated in section 4.
3 Temporal properties of the time series variables
In this section, we ﬁrst examine the assumption that wages, prices and productivity are
non-stationary. Second, we examine whether the residuals of the equilibrium correction
relationships are stationary. Stationary residuals between integrated variables imply a coin-
tegrating relationship between the variables in the long-term solution.
Time series for wages, productivity and producer price developments are taken from the
National Accounts. The unemployment rate is from the labour force survey, while consumer
prices, immigration and population ﬁgures are collected from the oﬃcial pages of Statistics
Norway. Variables measured in natural logarithms are denoted by lower case Latin letters.
Appendix A contains a detailed variable description.
3.1 The manufacturing sector
Wages, product prices and productivity in the manufacturing sector have increased over
time, see Figure 1. The statistical properties of the variables are tested using two unit
10
root tests, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) and a test by Kwiatowski et al. (1992)
referred to as KPSS henceforth. The null of the ADF test is a unit root, and a rejection of
the null implies that the time series is stationary. The null of the KPSS, on the other hand,
is stationarity. Hence a rejection implies that the time series is integrated. Both tests are
used to shed light on the time series properties.
The KPSS test rejects that w1 is stationary, see Table 1. The ADF test statistic (including
a constant, trend and seasonal dummies) is just above the critical value, which suggests the
opposite result. The KPSS test result is supported by the testing of stationarity of the
ﬁrst diﬀerence of the same variable. The ADF test statistic of w1 in diﬀerence (including
a constant and seasonal dummies) is clearly above the critical value. Results from both
ADF and KPSS tests indicate that the time series for product prices, q1 is integrated. The
ADF test statistic for productivity, z1, does not reject I(1), while the KPSS test indicates
that stationarity cannot be rejected. While the opposite is true for consumer prices, pt,
the ADF test rejects I(1), while the KPSS test strongly rejects stationarity. However, it is
logically inconsistent to regard CPI inﬂation as I(1), while interpreting wages and import
prices as stationary. In sum, we treat the variables as integrated of order 1 in the econometric
modelling.
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Figure 1: Components of the manufacturing wage share.
Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate, ut, and the immigration (ﬂow) rate , IMt. Both
variables are percentages (see Appendix A). The unemployment rate and the immigration
rate both reject stationarity according to the KPSS test, see Table 1. The graph shows
both the ﬁrst period of departure from post-war full employment in the ﬁrst half of the
1980s, and the return to near full employment in the years following deregulation of the
ﬁnancial markets (among other things). Next, unemployment increased again during the
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Figure 2: Plot of the logs of the unemployment rate and the immigration ﬂow.
1990s following the fall in oil prices, a restrictive ﬁscal policy, the collapse of house prices
and the ensuing banking crisis. Finally, the small changes in unemployment since 2005 are
interesting. The number of employed wage earners in Norway grew by an unprecedented
quarter of a million from 2005 to 2009. Naturally, the rate of unemployment fell, but not
nearly as much as employment increased. This is due to the high immigration rates. This
graph shows labour immigration to Norway from the EU and other developed countries. The
migration inﬂow amounts to 1.6 per cent of the total labour supply in 2011 and is clearly
large enough to signiﬁcantly aﬀect Norwegian labour markets and therefore possibly also
wage setting.
We have also investigated the properties of the residuals from a regression of equation
(3) and (6), see Table 2. The residuals from regression of equation (3) are labelled e1, while
the residuals from regression of equation (6) are labelled e1,UIM . The KPSS test statistic
for the wage share in Table 2 is lower and below the critical value if we control for shifts
in labour immigration and unemployment. The tests therefore imply that the wage share is
stationary when these variables are included. The ADF test does not reject the hypothesis
of a unit root, neither for e1 nor for e1,UIM .
3.2 The public sector and private services
We have also investigated the statistical properties in the two other sectors; public and
private services. Stationarity is rejected by the KPSS test for the hourly wage rate in both
sectors. Figure 3 shows wages in sector 2 relative to sector 1, e2, together with wages in sector
3 relative to sector 2, e3. While wages in sector 2 appear to follow wages in sector 1 quite
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Table 1: Unit root tests on the variables in levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences. Sample period 1980(1)
to 2011(4).1
Level First diﬀerence
Variable ADF (Lags) KPSS Char.2 Variable ADF (Lags) KPSS Char.2
w1 -3.714 (1) 0.282 c, t, s Δw1 -3.232 (4) 0.878 c, s
z1 -2.255 (3) 0.076 c, t, s Δz1 -10.22 (2) 0.055 c, s
q1 -2.382 (4) 0.263 c, t, s Δq1 -5.550 (3) 0.520 c, s
u -2.810 (4) 0.205 c, t, s Δu -3.841 (3) 0.160 c, s
p -5.979 (4) 0.310 c, t, s Δp -1.842 (3) 1.009 c, s
IM -0.728 (2) 0.260 c, t, s ΔIM -5.352 (1) 0.401 c, s
w2 -4.303 (4) 0.260 c, t, s Δw2 -2.659 (3) 0.818 c, s
w3 -4.290 (0) 0.192 c, t, s Δw3 -9.680 (3) 0.760 c, s
1Note, however, that the sample period varies due to the number of lags in the ADF test.
2The characteristics are a constant (c), a trend (t) and seasonal dummies (s).
The 5% critical value of the ADF test is -3.45 and -2.88 in level and diﬀerences respectively.
The 5% critical value of KPSS test is 0.146 in level and 0.463 in diﬀerences.
closely, the wage level in sector 3 was markedly lower than the wage level in sector 2 for a
long period. Although this reduction in the relative wage started in late 1980s, it is palusible
that it was related to the rise in unemployment in the 1990s and the tight government
budgets that characterised the ﬁrst half of the decade, in particular. This indicates that,
in the econometric model, the rate of unemployment can help to explain the development
in relative wages. In the last period, wages in sector 3 have increased relative to wages in
sector 2, while wages in sector 2 have decreased relative to sector 1. This is the period of
high labour immigration.
In Table 2, the residuals from the regression of (7) are labelled e2, while the residuals from
a regression of (7), which includes u and IM, are labelled e2,UI . The same regressions are
performed for sector 3 as well, and residuals are labelled e3 and e3,UI , respectively. According
to the ADF tests in Table 2, e2, ec2UI and ec3 are non stationary. Again, however, the
KPSS test supports the stationarity of the residuals and indicates that taking account of
the possibility that unemployment and immigration can inﬂuence the long-run relationships,
results in more stationary residuals.
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Table 2: Unit root tests on the wage share and the relative wages. Sample period 1980(2)
to 2011(4).
Variable ADF (Lags) KPSS Char.1
e1 -2.833 (3) 0.583 c
e1,UIM -2.751 (3) 0.305 c
e2 -2.439 (3) 0.428 c
e2,UIM -2.232 (3) 0.155 c
e3 -2.135 (3) 0.328 c
e3,UIM -3.153 (3) 0.170 c
The 5% critical value of the ADF test is −2.88 and 0.463 for the KPSS test
1The tests have included a constant (c) in the test.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
e2 e3 
Figure 3: Wages in sector 2 relative to sector 1 (e2) and wages in sector 3 relative to wages
in sector 2 (e3).
4 Econometric results
The previous section showed that univariate tests give clear support for unit-root non-
stationarity, and some initial support for three cointegration relations of the pattern bar-
gaining model. However, cointegration is a system property, and a concise way of testing
the long-run theory is to formulate a vector autoregression (VAR) and apply the maximum
likelihood method of Johansen (1995b). This step in the analysis is taken in section 4.1.
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In section 4.2, we specify a cointegrated equilibrium correction model (ECM) that is
consistent with the evidence from the VAR-based test of cointegration. The ECM is used
to further test the hypotheses about the dynamics of wage leader- and follower bargaining
model (the causal structure between the growth rates). The tests illustrate the relative
invariance of the model parameters after the change from a ﬁxed exchange rate to a ﬂoating
exchange rate and the surge in immigration rates.
4.1 Cointegration
We formulate a fourth order VAR for the three wage levels, manufacturing (w1), private
services (w2) and public sector (w3). We include the endogenous variables of the VAR in the
vector Ywt = (w1t, w2t, w3t)
′. The VAR is expressed as:
(13) ΔYwt =
3∑
i=1
ΓiΔYwt−i + ΠYt−1 + ΥQt + εt,
where all variables in the cointegration space are deﬁned in the extended data vector: Yt =
(Ywt, xt, τ1t, ut, IMt)
′. x = q1 + z1 is the wage-scope variable in the manufacturing sector.
The role of the payroll tax rate, τ1t, enables us to distinguish between the wage rate per
hour and the wage cost per hour. Γi (i = 1, . . . , 4) and Π are matrices with short-run and
long-run parameters for wages, unemployment and immigration.
Formally, τ1t, ut and IMt are also treated as I(1), since they are included in the Yt
vector. However, the tax rate is determined by political decisions and apparent unit root
non-stationarity is probably due to policy determined changes in the mean. As the discussion
above suggests, while ut and IMt are clearly non-stationary, the economically relevant ‘model
of stationarity’ is probably that they are also driven by intermittent structural breaks in their
means, rather than being convincingly represented by unit-root non-stationarity.
Qt is other non-modelled variables in the VAR, namely the lagged annual CPI inﬂation
rate and dummy variables. For simplicity, they are associated with the single matrix of
parameters Υ. Finally, the vector εt contains the VAR residuals for the three wage growth
rates.
As noted above, Qt in (13) implies that the VAR includes other variables as well. In terms
of economic interpretation, the most important variable is the lagged rate of consumer price
inﬂation, which is included to control for the eﬀects of cost of living considerations (as noted
above). In the sample period, there have been periods of centralised wage settlements (wage
laws), see e.g. Bowitz and Cappelen (2001) and Section 3. We include dummies for these
events, and for other quarters with outliers. Finally, we include a constant, three centred
seasonal dummies and a deterministic trend. The result is a relatively well-speciﬁed VAR.
The residuals, εˆt, have a tendency to be negatively auto-correlated, indicating a certain over-
ﬁtting. However, the test of joint non-normality of εt is insigniﬁcant at the 5 % signiﬁcance
level.
Π is often referred to as the long-run matrix, and it has the dimensions 3 × 7. Let r
denote the rank of Π. Since xt, τ1t, u and IM are non-modelled variables, r can be 0, 1, 2 or
3. r = 0 means that there is no cointegration, which would imply rejection of the theory we
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formulated above. If, on the other hand, r = 3, the variables xt, τ1t, u and IM represents
four common trends in the three nominal wage rates. The theory of wage leadership points
to the wage-scope variable xt = q1t + z1t as the most dominant trend in the system. This
is because the evolution of the scope variable deﬁnes the upward trend in the wage corridor
in the manufacturing sector. If wage leadership holds, this trend is transmitted to the two
other wage rates.
Π can be written as Π = αβ′, where α is 3 × r and β ( 7 × r) is the matrix with
cointegration parameters. The theory presented in section 2 implies τ = 3 with (3), (7) and
(10) as the cointegration relationship.
When conducting the cointegration rank test a trend is included and restricted to lie
in the cointegration space (i.e. included in Yt−1) such that critical value exist, see Harbo
et al. (1998). Table 3, column Trace test statistic presents the test statistic of the cointe-
gration analysis. The critical values of Doornik (2003) for zero, one and two cointegrating
relationships are presented in Table 3, column ﬁve. The trace test statistic for two or fewer
cointegration relationships is below the 10 % critical value for a standard integrated VAR
reported in Doornik (2003). This implies that the test rejects two or fewer cointegration
relationships at the 10 % signiﬁcance level. This result supports the hypothesis of three
cointegrating relationships. However, these critical values do not take into account exoge-
nous variables. The critical values increase with the number of exogenous variables included,
cf. Harbo et al. (1998). The critical values with four exogenous variables are shown in Table
3, last column.
The two ﬁrst test statistics are well above their respective critical values (adjusted for
exogenous variables), which supports that the number of stationary long-run relationships is
at least two. The last row shows that we are unable to formally reject two, and accept three,
cointegrating vectors. However, the critical values are for asymptotic distributions, and using
these critical values may lead to over-rejecting in small samples, see Doornik (1998). The
correction factor for critical values without exogenous variables is given in Johansen (2002).
Correction factors do not exist for critical values in cointegration analyses with exogenous
variables, but the correction factor without exogenous factors implies that the critical values
of Harbo et al. (1998) should be interpreted with care. We conclude that cointegration tests,
broadly interpreted, provide formal support for three cointegrating relationships ( r = 3),
but that equilibrium correction may be relatively weak.
Table 4, Panel 1, shows the maximised likelihood value, Log L, after we have omitted
the deterministic trend from the three long-run relationships. The trend was included for
the purpose of making correct inferences about the rank, but once the rank has been ﬁxed
to three, its signiﬁcance can be tested by a standard Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test with a
Chi-square distribution. In this case, the restriction is rejected at the 1 % level. However,
keeping a trend is without meaning economically, since the wage share and relative wages
will then drift deterministically. A closer inspection of the results also reveal that the trend
is sensitive to if the ﬁrst three years in public sector is included. There was a substantial
wage stop in public sector which ended in the beginning of the 80s and wages increased quite
rapidly in the following years. Hence, if the ﬁrst three years are excluded the tests imply
that the trend should be removed. We therefore conclude that the trend should be removed
from the cointegration space. In Table 4, we use the result of a rank equal to 3, but use a
VAR without trend when testing the identiﬁcation of the cointegrating relationships.
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Table 3: Tests of cointegration rank. Sample 1982(1)-2011(4).
Eigenvalue Trace 10% Critical value Doornik
(λi) H0 H1 Test statistic No exogenous With exogenous
0.37 r = 0 r >= 1 116.5 39.7 60.5
0.23 r <= 1 r >= 2 51.3 23.3 37.7
0.17 r <= 2 r >= 3 14.3 10.7 18.5
Endogenous variables: wages in manufacturing (w1), private services (w2) and public sector (w3).
Restricted variables: wage scope (x = q1 + z1) in manufacturing,
unemployment (u), immigration (IM) and a trend (t).
Unrestriced variables: payroll tax-rate, τ1, constant, seasonal dummies and some speciﬁc dummies which
capture important events in the Norwegian wage setting, see e.g. Bowitz and Cappelen (2001) and Section 4.
Removing the deterministic trend does not contribute to identiﬁcation. In Panel 1, we
therefore show the results after we have imposed identifying restrictions that are consistent
with the wage leadership theory. Speciﬁcally, the payroll tax rate is only included in the
cointegrating relationship, which is normalised on w1. This separates the second and third
relationships from the ﬁrst. The exclusion of x from the second and third relationships
provides more identifying information for these two relationships. In order to separate the
second from the third relationship, we exclude w1 and IM from the third, and w3 from the
second relationship. Finally, in order to identify the ﬁrst relationship, both w2 and w3 are
excluded from the relationship that is normalised on w1. The identiﬁed long-run relationships
are reported in Panel 1 of the table, together with the likelihood value and the Chi-square
distributed test of the seven over-identifying restrictions that represent the wage leadership
view of Norwegian wage formation. The restrictions are statistically acceptable at the 5 %
level.
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Table 4: Testing steady-state hypotheses
Unrestricted system for wages
w1 = βw2,1w2 + βw3,1w3 + βτ,1τ + βx,1x + βu,1u + βIM,1IM
w2 = βw1,2w1 + βw3,2w3 + βτ,3τ + βx,2x + βu,2u + βIM,2IM
w3 = βw1,3w1 + βw2,3w2 + βτ,3τ + βx,3x + βu,3u + βIM,3IM
Unrestricted Log L = 1365.79768
Panel 1: Identiﬁed long-run relationships
w1 = −1
(.)
τ + 1
(.)
x−0.38
(0.09)
u−1.72
(0.42)
IM
w2 = 1
(.)
w1 −0.40
(0.07)
u−0.51
(0.20)
IM
w3 = 1
(.)
w2 −0.07
(0.014)
u
Log L = 1359.27709, χ2(7) = 13.04[0.07]
Panel 2: Manufacturing wage leadership, αw1,2 = αw1,3 = 0
w1 = −1
(.)
τ + 1
(.)
x−0.41
(0.09)
u−1.76
(0.43)
IM
w2 = 1
(.)
w1 −0.40
(0.07)
u−0.57
(0.21)
IM
w3 = 1
(.)
w2 −0.08
(0.015)
u
Log L = 1359.25748, χ2(9) = 13.08[0.16]
Additional restrictions: χ2(2) = 0.04(0.98)
Panel 3: No response of Δw2 to (w2t−1 − w3t−1), αw2,3 = 0
w1 = −1
(.)
τ + 1
(.)
x−0.41
(0.09)
u−1.76
(0.43)
IM
w2 = 1
(.)
w1 −0.42
(0.07)
u−0.55
(0.19)
IM
w3 = 1
(.)
w2 −0.08
(0.016)
u
Log L = 1359.18919, χ2(10) = 13.22[0.21]
Additional restrictions: χ2(1) = 0.14[0.71]
Panel 4: No direct response of Δw3 to manufacturing norm, αw3,1 = 0
w1 = −1
(.)
τ + 1
(.)
x−0.58
(0.12)
u−2.45
(0.53)
IM
w2 = 1
(.)
w1 −0.17
(0.03)
u−0.18
(0.15)
IM
w3 = 1
(.)
w2 −0.04
(0.01)
u
Log L = 1358.39232, χ2(11) = 14.81[0.19]
Additional restrictions: χ2(1) = 1.59[0.21]
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Conditional on the identiﬁed long-run relationships, we can begin to test for the minimum
restrictions that imply no feed-back from w2 and w3 to w1. The results are reported in Panel
2 of the table, using αi,j to denote the element in row i, column j in the matrix with loadings
parameters. The increase in the test of the over-identifying restrictions is small. Therefore
it is not surprising that two zero restrictions that distinguish Panel 2 from Panel 1, are
statistically acceptable (the incremental test yields χ2(2) = 0.04[0.98]). We note that the
estimated cointegration parameters also change very little from Panel 1 to Panel 2.
We conclude that the tests in Panel 1 and 2 provide relatively clear support for the view
that the wage-leading role of the manufacturing sector has been in operation during our
sample period. The result is diﬀerent from those estimated by Nymoen (1991), who was
unable to impose the wage-leading restrictions when estimating on a sample that started in
1969(1) and ended in 1987(4). As a result, he speciﬁed a preferred model that allowed for
wage-wage eﬀects. The diﬀerent samples might be relevant here, since the 1970s in particular
were characterized by super high wage inﬂation in certain years. Some of this may have been
driven by low coordination and wage-wage inﬂation.5
Returning to Table 4, Panel 3 and 4 test additional restrictions implied by pattern wage
bargaining. In panel 3, we add the restriction that the deviations from the second and third
cointegration relationships are not corrected by manufacturing wages. This result shows that
the increase in the test of over-identifying restrictions is small, and the incremental test does
not reject additional restrictions. The cointegration parameters are also very similar when
we compare Panel 2 and Panel 3. Finally, in Panel 4, the restriction that wages in sector 3
does not equilibrium correct with respect to the ﬁrst cointegrating relationship is imposed.
Although this restriction is acceptable, we note that the parameter estimates change notably.
We return to the question of a possible contemporaneous eﬀect of w1 on w3 in the structural
model below.
The point estimates in the best identiﬁed models, e.g. in Panel 3, deserve comment. In the
manufacturing sector (Sector 1), the elasticity of wages (βu,1) with respect to unemployment
is higher in absolute value than the estimates in, e.g., Nymoen (1989) and Johansen (1995a),
who used data from the 1980s.
This may be due to the larger variation of ut in our sample, which includes the period
after the Norwegian banking crisis in the 1990s. For Sector 2, the estimated unemployment
elasticity is practically the same (βˆu,2 = −0.4). We note, however, that this implies that
the estimated long-run wage responsiveness for the private wage-following sector is twice
as large as for the wage-leading sector. This is realistic, since this sector is characterized
by weaker union organisation and lower capacity for multi-employer agreements than in
the manufacturing sector. In the public sector, the estimated parameter of unemployment
(βu,3) is much lower (in absolute value) than in the two other sectors, which is also reasonable
given that changes in overall unemployment have little direct relevance for the two bargaining
parties.
Since labour immigration is a new phenomenon, there are no studies that can serve as
direct references for discussing our results for the parameters βIM,1 and βIM,2 in Panel 3.
5There are other diﬀerences as well, both in the data deﬁnitions and in the econometric methodology.
Nymoen did not identify the cointegrating relationships separately from the short-run dynamics, as we will
do. This may have led to poorer identiﬁcation of his long-run relationships.
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However, one important study that use micro data reports evidence that immigration has
causally reduced wage earnings in certain sectors of the Norwegian economy, see Bratsberg
and Raaum (2012). Compared to our own earlier research using single equation estimation
methods, the estimated value of βˆIM,1 = −1.7 is very large, see Gjelsvik et al. (2013). Note,
however, that the estimated standard error indicates a broad 95 % conﬁdence interval. The
single equation estimation just mentioned provides point estimates of somewhat less than
−1 for the wage-leading sector, and this value is within the conﬁdence interval with good
margin.
Based on the above interpretation of the evidence we have speciﬁed the following equi-
librium correction variables for use in a structural econometric model:
êc1t = w1t + τt − xt + 0.38ut + 1.1IMt(14)
êc2t = w2t − w1t + 0.40ut + 0.51IMt(15)
êc3t = w3t − w3t + 0.07ut(16)
The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence from Panel 1, is that we have adjusted the point estimate of
the coeﬃcient of IM in (14). The estimation results of the dynamic structural model will
conﬁrm that this downsizing of the direct eﬀect of immigration on the manufacturing wage
is data-acceptable.
4.2 A dynamic simultaneous equations econometric model
In this section, we formulate and estimate a dynamic model model that is consistent with
the cointegration analysis, and which is identiﬁed econometrically. At this stage in the
analysis we include CPI inﬂation into the model in an explicit way, which was suggested to
be important to wage formation in Section 2.
In the VAR above, the lagged four-quarter change in the log of the oﬃcial consumer
price index, denoted Δ4pt−1 was included among the variables in Qt in (13). In the same
way as for the lagged wage growth rates, we can think of lagged price inﬂation as a variable
in a reduced form obtained from a simultaneous equations model, SEM, that includes price
inﬂation among the endogenous variables. In order to model price growth jointly with wage
growth, we need a separate long-run relationship for the price level. We do not carry out
a cointegration analysis for the price level in this paper. Instead, we use the following
equilibrium correction term
(17) êc4t = pt − 0.6(w1t + τt − z1t)− 0.4pii
where the elasticities for unit wage cost and import price, pi, are taken from the econometric
results in B˚ardsen et al. (2003).
The SEM model can formally be expressed as:
(18) B0Ywpt =
3∑
i=1
BiYwpt−i + AECt−1 + ΥQt + t,
where Ywpt = (Δw1t, Δw2t, Δw3t,Δ4pt)
′ contains changes in wages and the consumer price
index, EC contains the long run relationships in (14)-(17) and Qt is redeﬁned to exclude
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consumer prices. A is a diagonal matrix and all the elements of the diagonal in B0 is equal
to one.
The last four columns in table 5 show coeﬃcient estimates (Aˆ) for an identiﬁed four
equation SEM, where a diagonal matrix with adjustment coeﬃcients for the four ec-terms is
suﬃcient for identiﬁcation on the rank condition.6 The maximised log likelihood reported in
the last row serves as the unrestricted likelihood value that we use to test the wage-leadership-
followership restrictions in Table 6.7 The two test statistics are (FAR), for autocorrelation
of order between 1 and 5, and non-normality (χ2NORM ), calculated from the SEM residuals.
They are system versions of autocorrelation and normality tests, see Doornik and Hendry
(2013), and are reported with asymptotic p-values in square brackets.
Table 5: Wage-price SEM. FIML estimates of the contemporaneous coeﬃcient matrix Bˆ0
(ﬁrst four columns with estimates) and adjustment coeﬃcients Aˆ (last four columns). Stan-
dard errors in brackets below the estimates. Sample period 1980(1) to 2011(4).
Δw1t Δw2t Δw3t Δ4pt êc1t−1 êc2t−1 êc3t−1 êc4t−1
Δw1t −1 −0.05
(0.15)
−0.04
(0.10)
0.37
(0.06)
−0.04
(0.01)
0 0 0
Δw2t 0.42
(0.06)
−1 0.03
(0.06)
0.05
(0.09)
0 −0.04
(0.006)
0 0
Δw3t 0.17
(0.08)
0.24
(0.12)
−1 0.16
(0.03)
0 0 −0.19
(0.03)
0
Δ4pt 0.02
(0.06)
−0.12
(0.12)
0.09
(0.09)
−1 0 0 0 −0.10
(0.02)
Log L= 1892.0816, FAR = 1.18[0.16] and χ
2
NORM = 12.6[0.12].
Table 5 shows that the diagonal elements of the matrix with adjustments coeﬃcients for
the ec-terms are statistically signiﬁcant, although the numerical values are relatively small
for the ﬁrst two. This is consistent with the results in Table 3 and Table 4. The results
for the contemporaneous parameters (Bˆ0) also show a clear pattern. In the row for Δw1t,
the two coeﬃcients of Δw2t and Δw3t are negative (“wrong sign”), but they are statistically
insigniﬁcant from zero values (judged by the standard errors). Conversely, Δw1t has a
sizeable estimated coeﬃcient in the rows for Δw2t and Δw3t, which supports the hypothesis
that the manufacturing sector is wage-leading, with private service production and the public
sector as wage-followers.
The ﬁrst row in Table 6 shows that three versions of the null hypothesis that manufac-
turing is not wage-leading, are formally rejected at the 5 % level. In the second line of tests,
the second entry supports that the private service sector is wage-leading in relation to the
public sector. The third row of tests shows that the coeﬃcient of Δw3t can be restricted to
6At this stage, there are no restrictions on the correlation matrix of the contemporaneous disturbances,
which means that the rank condition is necessary and suﬃcient.
7Note that this likelihood is not comparable to the corresponding in Table 4, since the model in Table 5
includes CPI inﬂation as an endogenous variable
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Table 6: Likelihood-ratio tests of wage-leader/follower restrictions on the model in Table 5
Restrictions: Sec 1  Sec 2 Sec 1 Sec 3 Sec1 Sec 2 and 3
χ2(1) = 54.5∗∗ χ2(1) = 4.6∗ χ2(2) = 54.9∗∗
Restrictions: Sec 2  Sec 1 Sec 2 Sec 3 Sec 2 Sec 1 and 3
χ2(1) = 0.11 χ2(1) = 4.4∗ χ2(2) = 4.7
Restrictions: Sec 3  Sec 1 Sec 3 Sec 2 Sec 3 Sec 1 and 2
χ2(1) = 0.19 χ2(1) = 0.20 χ2(2) = 0.42
∗ and ∗∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1 % levels.
zero in both the manufacturing sector wage equation and in the private service sector wage
equation without any signiﬁcant drop in the likelihood value.
We next turn to the role of price inﬂation as measured by Δ4pt. This variable is signiﬁcant
with a large estimated coeﬃcient in the manufacturing wage equation. The coeﬃcient of
inﬂation in the equation for Δw2t is close to zero, but can note that there is a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the lagged inﬂation rate in this equation, see Appendix B with detailed estimation
results.
The last row of Table 5, with the results for the inﬂation equation Δ4pt, shows that there
is little support for within-quarter eﬀects of wage changes on inﬂation. 8 However, since êc4t
includes wage costs (w1t+ ln (1 + τ t)), we nevertheless have a closed feed-back loop between
wages and CPI.
Table 7 shows the results of a restricted estimation where we have imposed all of the six
exclusion restrictions discussed above. Compared to Table 5, the retained coeﬃcients change
very little.
Table 7: Wage-price SEM with wage leader-follower restrictions imposed. FIML estimates
of Bˆ0 and Aˆ in equation (18) with standard errors in brackets below the estimates. Sample
period 1980(1) to 2011(4).
Δw1t Δw2t Δw3t Δ4pt êc1t−1 êc2t−1 êc3t−1 êc4t−1
Δw1t −1 0 0 0.35
(0.06)
−0.04
(0.01)
0 0 0
Δw2t 0.42
(0.06)
−1 0 0.06
(0.09)
0 −0.04
(0.01)
0 0
Δw3t 0.17
(0.08)
0.25
(0.12)
−1 0.16
(0.03)
0 0 −0.19
(0.03)
0
Δ4pt 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −0.10
(0.02)
Log L =1890.98642, FAR = 1.17[0.17] and χ
2
NORM = 13.0[0.11]
LR test of wage-leader following restrictions: χ2(6) = 2.19[0.14]
8The estimated SEM includes three unrestricted lags in the quarterly inﬂation rate in the fourth row. This
ensures that there are no restrictions implied by normalisation on Δ4pt in the fourth row. This representation
is convenient for modelling the eﬀects of inﬂation on wage dynamics.
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It is interesting that Table 5 and Table 7 show that inﬂation expectations 9 have a signif-
icant eﬀect on wage formation in the manufacturing sector, and therefore on the wage norm
of the system. Is this evidence of inﬂation targeting in the sense that the wage increases in
the manufacturing sector are led by the inﬂation forecast of the Central Bank rather than
by the evolution of the wage scope? In order to investigate this possibility, as well as the
invariance of the system with respect to the monetary policy regime shift more generally,
we turn to the estimation results on a sample that ends before the structural break in the
market for foreign exchange and in interest rate determination.
4.3 Stability and invariance
In order to address the the question of stability of the wage formation structure, we have
estimated the model on a sample that ends in 2000(4). This sample ends before the labour
immigration from Europe started, and it is unlikely that the immigration eﬀects on wages
that we estimated above are invariant to the shortening of the sample.
Consequently, it does not make sense to deﬁne the three wage equilibrium correction
terms in the same way as in (14)-(16). Instead, we remove IMt and ut from the equilibrium
correction variables, which for the short sample are deﬁned as:
êcs1t = w1t + τt − x1t(19)
êcs2t = w2t − w1t(20)
êcs3t = w3t − w2t(21)
implying the same long-run relationships as in the full sample. The estimated system is
therefore speciﬁed by including immigration and unemployment as exogenous I(0)-variables
(but subject to breaks) in the system. For the CPI level, we use (17) as the equilibrium
correction term also in the short sample.
The results of the estimation with the wage-leadership-follower restrictions imposed are
shown in Table 8. The estimation results are very similar to the full sample estimates in
Table 7, although the joint test of the six restrictions is marginally signiﬁcant at the 5 %
level. However, and as previously discussed, the test statistic is not corrected for the smaller
sample size. The details show that this is mainly due to an estimated negative coeﬃcient
of Δw2t in the Δw1t equation, i.e. the same sign problem that we noted for the full sample
results, but more pronounced on the short sample. Appendix B contains Table 10 with the
detailed dynamic speciﬁcation for the short sample.
9Inﬂation in period t is included as an endogenous variable in the model estimated by FIML. Therefore,
the inﬂation variable in the manufacturing sector wage equation for example, can be interpreted as an
expectations variable.
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Table 8: Pre inﬂation targeting wage-price SEM with wage-leader-follower restrictions im-
posed. FIML estimates with standard errors in round brackets below the estimates. Sample
period 1980(1) to 2000(4).
Δw1t Δw2t Δw3t Δ4pt êcs1t−1 êcs2t−1 êcs3t−1 êc4t−1
Δw1t −1 0 0 0.32
(0.06)
−0.05
(0.02)
0 0 0
Δw2t 0.45
(0.06)
−1 0 0.11
(0.13)
0 −0.11
(0.09)
0 0
Δw3t 0.15
(0.09)
0.49
(0.14)
−1 0.16
(0.04)
0 0 −0.24
(0.08)
0
Δ4pt 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −0.08
(0.02)
Log L =1288.14658, FAR = 1.10[0.29] and χ
2
NORM = 14.3[0.08]
LR test of wage-leader following restrictions: χ2(6) = 12.39[0.05]
The results show in particular that in manufacturing the estimated coeﬃcient of Δ 4pt is
0.32, with a t-value of 5.1. This is very close to the full sample results. Taken together, the
two estimates show that the eﬀect of inﬂation expectations on the wage norm was in place
before inﬂation targeting was introduced. This is not surprising since CPI expectations have
been an important part of the wage setting system for decades. Coordination of inﬂation ex-
pectations among representatives of the employer and employee confederations has been one
of the main purposes of the TCC institution long before inﬂation targeting was introduced.
Another way of illustrating the stability of the estimated structure is by forecasting.
Figure 4 shows dynamic forecasts for the period 2001(1) to 2011(4). As can be expected,
there are some examples of forecast failures (actuals outside the forecast uncertainty fans), in
particular for inﬂation. However, a major structural break in the 40-quarter forecast period
would have resulted in much clearer forecast.
Finally, we illustrate relative parameter stability in the dynamic multipliers of the struc-
tural model. In Figure 5, the impulse responses to a shock in the inﬂation equation (an
inﬂation shock) are shown. There are two graphs in each panel, corresponding to the short
sample estimation and the full sample estimation. In all panels, the dynamic multipliers
are very similar, illustrating that the results of this policy analysis do not depend on the
ten years of inﬂation targeting. The sign of the multipliers changes from positive to neg-
ative. The interpretation is that, because the long-run growth rate in the manufacturing
sector depends on producer price growth and productivity growth, the short-run inﬂuence
of a shock to inﬂation will mean overshooting in manufacturing sector wages. Because of
the wage-leader role of manufacturing, the overshooting spills over to wages in the two other
sectors.
Figure 6 shows the impulse response parameters of a shock to the immigration rate
(IM). These impulse responses are not invariant. As noted above, this is not surprising
given that the surge in immigration came after 2000 (cf. Figure 2). Speciﬁcally, it is the
eﬀects of increased immigration on wage formation in the manufacturing sector that are
underestimated on the sample that ends in 2000(4). Since wage growth in the wage-leading
sector is important for the overall nominal path of the Norwegian economy, this spills over
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Figure 4: Dynamic forecasts with a 95 per cent forecast uncertainty fans. Forecasts are in
blue, actuals in red. The estimation period is from 1980(1) to 2000(4).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of a shock to the rate of quarterly inﬂation of 0.01 per cent.
to the inﬂation impulse responses in particular, which are severely underestimated on the
sample that ends in 2000(4).
26
sample end 2011(4) sample end 2000(4) 
0 10 20 30 40
-0.0050
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025 Δw1t 
sample end 2011(4) sample end 2000(4) 
0 10 20 30 40
-0.0050
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
Δw2t 
sample end 2011(4) sample end 2000(4) 
0 10 20 30 40
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
Δw3t sample end 2011(4) sample end 2000(4) 
0 10 20 30 40
-0.00075
-0.00050
-0.00025
0.00000
0.00025 Δ4  pt 
Figure 6: Impulse responses of a shock to the immigration rate by 0.10 percentage points.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have modelled wages in three sectors of the Norwegian economy; manufac-
turing, private services and public sector. The model represents the typical pattern of wage
bargaining in Norway, where manufacturing sector negotiates ﬁrst and where the outcome
is considered to be the wage norm for the other sectors of the economy. The logic of this
pattern is simple, if the wage growth in the exposed sector becomes a wage norm for wage
setting in the other sectors, the functional income distribution will be relative both in the
wage-leading and wage-following sectors. The wage norm is deﬁned in a system of arbitration
that involves self-interest among both workers and ﬁrms, but, fundamentally also compro-
mise. As noted in the introduction, the analysis of the system of wage formation as a ‘social
institution’ applies quite, cf Solow (1990). generally. What is perhaps more special about
Norway is the continued importance of collective wage agreements, and the roles that the
confederate labour market organizations hold the tripartite interaction between government
and social partners.10.
Over the last 10-15 years, there have been two speciﬁc challenges to the Norwegian system
of wage formation. First, the change to a ﬂoating exchange rate and, as a consequence,
inﬂation targeting monetary policy. Second, the rise in labour immigration from outside
Scandinavia. Both changes could potentially aﬀect the bargaining power or the gain of
coordinating wage formation, and hence change the recursive structure of wage formation in
Norway.
The analytical framework that we specify, allows us to test the historical pattern of wage
bargaining with a model with no pattern imposed. The model also allows the level of net
immigration ﬂow to aﬀect wages separately.
The empirical results give the following answers to the questions posed in the introduc-
tion. The cointegration analysis show that there is a stable long term relationship between
wage levels in the three sectors, with the manufacturing sector as the wage leader. Therefore,
wage growth in manufacturing still constitute the wage norm of the Norwegian wage forma-
tion. The empirical results show that the wage norm in manufacturing depends heavily on
the proﬁtability growth in the same sector, which is consistent with the theory of collective
wage bargaining, but the long term wage level is lower due to the negative and signiﬁcant ef-
fect of the immigration ﬂow. Immigration has also aﬀected the relative wage between private
and public services. This might suggest that immigration has aﬀected bargaining power (a
parameter of the system), but so far without fundamentally altering the pattern wage bar-
gaining system. And although both unions and employment confederations have understood
the nature and aims of monetary policy, we ﬁnd no indication that the Norwegian monetary
policy in 2001 has changed the system of wage formation or that inﬂation expectations have
become more important.
Immigration eﬀects apart, we ﬁnd that the econometric model has more or less the same
parameter estimates on two diﬀerent samples: one with the period of inﬂation targeting, and
another that ends before this policy change was formally introduced in 2001. The impulse
responses of a shock to inﬂation also show a high degree of invariance. The recursive structure
where the wage settlements in manufacturing represent a norm for wage setting is still an
10cf. OECD (2012, p. 15)
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important part of the Norwegian wage settlements, despite both the structural break in
monetary policy and high immigration rates. Hence, the corrosion of, or the attacks on
the system of coordinated bargaining analyzed by Marginson (2014) have not been seen in
Norway. Instead, the level of coordination is probably notably higher than it was during
the 1980s, as also Visser (2013) concludes in his broad analysis of trends in wage bargaining
institutions , see Visser (2013, p. 63)
One of the explanations why inﬂation targeting had little impact on the structure of wage
setting, may be that the system of wage formation already included an important element of
inﬂation forecasting and expectations formation. Formally, the Technical Calculation Com-
mittee for Wage Settlements has for decades helped to synchronize the inﬂation anticipations
of unions and by ﬁrms. For this reason, the central bank’s focus on inﬂation forecast and
expectations when inﬂation targeting started in 2001, was not as “new” to wage and price
setters as some commentators would have it.
There are of course other aspects of monetary policy that aﬀect how diﬃcult or easy it
is to reconcile inﬂation targeting with the Norwegian system of wage formation. It is quite
likely that a practice of strict inﬂation targeting (large weight on the inﬂation-gap and short
policy horizon) would have put stress on the system. However, Norges Bank has presented
itself as a super ﬂexible inﬂation targeter. The indication is that the prospects for both
unemployment and GDP growth carried large weights in the interest rate policy decisions
already before the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. During most of the period of inﬂation targeting,
Norges Bank have adopted a relatively long policy horizon, and has shown no haste in closing
inﬂation gaps. The possibility that monetary policy in the future will become more strict to
changes in wage setting remains only a vague prospect.
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A Data deﬁnitions and sources
As explained in the text, lower case letters refer to the logarithm of the original variables
listed below. For example, ut = log(Ut) denotes the log of the unemployment rate. Variables
in ﬁrst diﬀerences are denoted by Δ. Subscripts denote time period. For example, pt−4 refers
to the (log of) the price level four periods back.
Wit−Index for hourly wage in sector i=1,2,3
Pt− Consumer price index
Q1t− Price deﬂator of gross value added, manufacturing industry
Z1t− Labour productivity, output per hour in manufacturing
PIt− Price deﬂator on imports of goods and services
Ut− Unemployment rate, in per cent. Civilian unemployment,
IMt− Immigration from land group 1 and 2, in percent of the population aged 15-74. Group 1
include EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Group 2 includes
Eastern Europe except EU countries.
τt− represents the natural logarithm of the payroll tax rate plus one.
All variables are from the database of the macroeconometric model KVARTS, maintained
by Statistics Norway.
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B Additional estimation results
In this appendix, Table 9 shows the detailed dynamic speciﬁcation of the model in Table 7,
while Table 10 is the counterpart to Table 8 in the main text.
Table 9: The dynamic speciﬁcation of the leader-followership model in Table 7
Sector 1 (manufacturing)
Δw1t = − 0.1198
(0.0368)
Δ ln(1 + τt)− 0.3834
(0.0489)
Δ3w1t−1 − 0.04055
(0.00797)
êc1t−1 + 0.3462
(0.042)
Δ4pt
Sector 2 (private service)
Δw2t = 0.4245
(0.0558)
Δw1t + 0.2073
(0.0458)
Δ3w1t−1 − 0.5011
(0.054)
Δ3w2t−1 − 0.03664
(0.00553)
êc2t−1
+ 0.07038
(0.0853)
Δ4pt + 0.1422
(0.0792)
Δ4pt−1 − 0.01784
(0.00476)
Δut−2
Sector 3 (public sector)
Δw3t = 0.1659
(0.0787)
Δw1t + 0.2506
(0.117)
Δw2t − 0.08951
(0.0467)
Δw3t−1 − 0.3811
(0.0502)
Δw3t−2
− 0.2221
(0.0454)
Δw3t−3 − 0.1857
(0.0311)
êc3t−1 + 0.1578
(0.0322)
Δ4pt
cpi-equation:
Δpt = − 0.1779
(0.0807)
Δpt−1 − 0.02421
(0.0766)
Δpt−2+ 0.129
(0.0727)
Δpt−3 + 0.2619
(0.0736)
Δpt−4
− 0.1047
(0.0166)
êc4t−1
mis-specifications tests† and encompassing (the var) test‡:
FAR = 1.1666[0.1748] χ
2
NORM = 13.001[0.1118] χ
2
ENC−V AR = 83.025[0.0653]
Notes
Sample 1980(1)-2011(4). Estimation is by FIML. Deterministic terms are omitted
Standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
êcit−1 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are explained in the text.
†System versions of 1-5 order autocorrelation test and normality test, see Doornik and Hendry (2013)
†The likelihood-ratio test of the over-identifying restriction, see Doornik and Hendry (2013)
The numbers in [ ] are p-values of these tests
The quarterly rate of change in the manufacturing wage rate is seen to depend negatively
on the change in the payroll tax rate. This implies that tax increases are rolled back to the
wage earners. Since êc1t includes w1t+τt−q1t−z1t, the wage level increases one-for-one with
a reduction in the payroll tax rate. This means that the hourly wage cost is independent of
the payroll tax rate in the long run. This result has been found in earlier empirical studies,
also on aggregated data. The negative coeﬃcient of the three-quarter lagged change in the
wage rate (Δ3w1t−1) is also known from earlier studies, see for example Nymoen (1989a). It
reﬂects the fact that most of the adjustment of the wage level takes place in the same quarter
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each year (the second). The estimated eﬀect of an expected rise in the annual inﬂation rate
(Δ4pt) of 1 percentage point is as high as 0.3462. The eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant with an
implied t-value of 8.08. The implication for the wage norm is discussed in the main text.
The two last variables in the manufacturing wage equation are the unemployment rate
(ut), in log form, and net labour immigration (IMt) in per cent. The unemployment eﬀect
is well known from previous studies and represents a moderately convex wage curve, see
e.g. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994), Hoel and Nymoen (1988) and Nymoen and Rødseth
(1998). The eﬀect of IMt could not have been estimated on samples that do not include the
massive inﬂow of labour immigrants since 2005.
Wage growth in the private service sector is strongly inﬂuenced by both the (expected)
wage norm (Δw1t) and by lagged manufacturing wage increases (Δ3w1t−1). The coeﬃ-
cient of the lagged relative wage with respect to manufacturing ( eˆc2t−1) is also sizeable and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Taken together, this is strong evidence in favour of wage-
following behaviour. The ﬁnding that the annual CPI inﬂation rate enters at one lag, and
with a lower estimated parameter than in manufacturing, also indicates that wage adjust-
ments in the private service sector are mainly anchored by the wage norm. That said, we
also estimate signiﬁcant eﬀects of unemployment and immigration in the wage equation for
the private service sector, with about same sized coeﬃcients, as in the manufacturing sector
wage equation.
The public sector wage equation shows contemporaneous eﬀects of quarterly wage in-
creases in both sector 1 and sector 2, but with more weight on the wage in the private
sector. The wage relative to sector 2 is signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the wage settle-
ments in the public sector being last in the chain. We pick up a similar eﬀect of the expected
rise in the cost of living as in sector 2, which therefore emerges as a systemic feature of
Norwegian wage formation. The same is true for the eﬀect of the rate of unemployment.
A permanent increase in the rate of unemployment lowers the relative wages in the sector,
which is consistent with Figure 3.
The structural wage-setting model implies a restricted reduced form maximised likelihood
that can be compared to the maximised likelihood of the unrestricted system, or VAR. Since
we have a set of over-identifying restrictions, the statistical validity of the ordered wage-
ﬁxing system can be tested with respect to the unordered wage-setting system (the VAR)
by a likelihood ratio test. This is the χ2ENC−V AR reported at the end of Table 9, and the
interpretation of the p-value of 0.26 is that the ordered system represents no signiﬁcant loss
of explanatory power relative to the unrestricted and unordered VAR model. The unordered
purely statistical system is encompassed by the structural model, see Hendry and Mizon
(1993) and (Hendry 1995, Chapter 14). B˚ardsen et al. (2005, Ch. 3) presents an application
to Norwegian wage-price dynamics of this econometric approach.
We next turn to the detailed results for the dynamic speciﬁcation of the 1980(1)-2000(4)
dataset, cf. Table 10 before inﬂation targeting was formally introduced in 2001 and while
labour immigration to Norway was at a low level. As noted in the main text, it is reason-
able to include the unemployment rate and the immigration rate as unrestricted stationary
variables on this sample, so that the equilibrium correction terms (denoted êcsit i = 1, 2, 3)
become the wage share for sector 1, and the two relative wage rates for sectors 2 and 3.
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Table 10: The dynamic speciﬁcation of the leader-followership model in Table 8. Sample
1980(1) - 2000(4).
Sector 1 (manufacturing)
Δw1t = − 0.1026
(0.0345)
Δτ1 − 0.27
(0.0498)
Δ3w1t−1 − 0.04604
(0.0196)
êcs1t−1
+ 0.3152
(0.0622)
Δ4pt − 0.01443
(0.00488)
ut−1 − 0.00003
(0.0826)
IMt
Sector 2 (private services)
Δw2t = 0.1531
(0.09)
Δw1t + 0.2177
(0.0675)
Δ3w1t−1 − 0.5042
(0.0831)
Δ3w2t−1 − 0.1139
(0.0949)
êcs2t−1
+ 0.1079
(0.134)
Δ4p1 + 0.09343
(0.124)
Δ4pt−1 − 0.01391
(0.00396)
ut−1 − 0.01472
(0.00569)
Δut−2 − 0.0314
(0.0602)
IMt−4
Sector 3 (Public Sector)
Δw3t = 0.4935
(0.14)
Δw1t + 0.4935
(0.14)
Δw2t − 0.03097
(0.0582)
Δw3t−1 − 0.3398
(0.0581)
Δw3t−2
− 0.1608
(0.0484)
Δw3t−3 − 0.2443
(0.0823)
êcs3t−1 + 0.1585
(0.0425)
Δ4pt − 0.01027
(0.00296)
ut−1
cpi-equation:
Δpt = − 0.01002
(0.102)
Δpt−1 − 0.04616
(0.104)
Δpt−2 − 0.2634
(0.0884)
Δpt−3+ 0.3841
(0.0863)
Δpt−4 − 0.07642
(0.0184)
êc4t−1
misspecifications tests† and var encompassing test‡:
FAR = 1.1046[0.2890] χ
2
NORM = 14.251[0.0755] χ
2
ENC−V AR = 143.08[0.0000]
Notes
Sample 1980(1)-2000(4). Estimation is by FIML. Deterministic terms are omitted
Standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
êcsit (i = 1, 2, 3) and êc4t are explained in the main text.:
†System versions of 1-5 order autocorrelation and normality tests,
see Doornik and Hendry (2013)
‡The likelihood-ratio test of over-identifying restrictions, see Doornik and Hendry (2013)
The numbers in [ ] are p-values of these tests
The similarity of the results for the short-run wage leadership-followership sample com-
pared to the full sample results is discussed in the main text. The implied long-run wage
equations from the short-sample results become:
w1 = τt − x1t − 0.31u− 0IM(22)
w2 = w1 − 0.12u− 0.28IM(23)
w3 = w2 − 0.04u(24)
which are comparable to, e.g., Panel 4 in Table 4. The main diﬀerence is that the esti-
mated eﬀect of immigration on the wage-leading sector is zero on the short-sample, which
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is reasonable since “normal” labour immigration to Norway probably has little impact on
the bargaining power of the trade unions in the wage-leading sector. In the private wage-
following sector, there is an estimated eﬀect, which is also reasonable since there is more
direct market regulation and weaker unions in this sector.
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